Governance aspects of cross-border EU competition actions: theoretical and practical challenges by Danov, M & Becker, F
Journal of Private International Law – Accepted for Publication – approx. 21,000 words 
1 
 
 
GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER EU COMPETITION 
ACTIONS: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 
MIHAIL DANOV AND FLORIAN BECKER 
  
 
Abstract: The authors have aimed to produce a theoretical model which considers the choice 
of governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions. To this end, they have 
analysed the current litigation pattern (and litigants’ strategies). On this basis, the specific 
issues which arise in cross-border EU competition law actions have been identified with a view 
to proposing an appropriate course for any reform in the area. A mix of research methods have 
been used - in addition to employing traditional library based legal research methods, opinions 
of legal practitioners from England and Germany and policy-makers from Brussels have been 
considered. The article demonstrates that, given the diverse nature of the European Union, a 
new mode of governance should be used by the EU legislator in order to close the EU 
competition law enforcement gap. The authors suggest that Regulation 1/2003 should 
incorporate a specifically designated private international law mechanism which promotes 
inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area of EU competition law dispute resolution, 
and produces efficient enforcement results in a multi-level system of governance. It has been 
submitted that some of the specific problems that arise may be best addressed by appropriately 
drafted private international rules which address inter alia the low mobility of consumers and 
SMEs.  
A. INTRODUCTION AND SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (ex Arts 81 and 82 TEC) are the main competition law provisions 
contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Regulation 1/2003 
replaced the centralised system, which was set up by Regulation 17/1962, with a directly 
applicable exception system, in which the Member States’ courts have the power to apply and 
enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Previous research has shown that, through enhanced 
private antitrust enforcement reform, private international law has gained a pivotal role in EU 
competition law disputes with an international element in Europe.
1
 The important role of 
private international law in the context of competition law enforcement is further re-iterated in 
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recent edited collections of papers.
2
 The aim of EU competition law enforcement policy is to 
deter infringements and provide redress to those who have suffered harm from them.
3
 
However, research demonstrates that there is an enforcement gap at present.
4
 The Ashurst 
study, which was conducted in 2004, appears to indicate that the private antitrust enforcement 
in Europe may be characterised by its “astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment”.5 
The level of diversity in the area may be regarded as problematic because the EU relies on the 
individual Member States’ legal orders to enforce the EU competition law provisions and the 
rights of the individuals derived from the TFEU. It is well established that there are “three 
types of Community Courts, not just two: the ECJ, the CFI, and national courts. [...] The 
rationale for inclusion of national courts in [the EU judicial system] is of course that they are 
enforcers of [EU] law in their own right [...].”6 The problem is that even jurisdictions like 
England and Germany, which represent the leading competition law regimes in Europe, 
appear to be attracting primarily follow-on actions.
7
 This is a cause for concern as public 
enforcers across Europe are unlikely to have the resources to investigate all the complaints 
they receive.
8
 Moreover, even in cases where competition law infringements were established, 
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a significant number of injured parties
9
 (i.e. consumers and businesses) from across Europe 
would remain uncompensated as it would normally be the large purchasers suing.
10
 Recent 
research on collective redress actions across Europe has demonstrated that “the number of 
actions related to antitrust infringements is still very limited.”11 The existence of an 
enforcement gap was recently noted by the UK Government
12
 in its response to the 
consultation on options for reform. It was submitted that “the strong sense from the 
consultation was that [competition law] cases are almost exclusively between large 
companies, and that smaller companies and consumers still have no realistic way of 
challenging breaches of competition law or gaining redress.”13  
Shall the EU legislator address the existing enforcement gap? It is well established that 
private enforcement is intended to complement public enforcement by allowing injured 
parties who have suffered harm caused by a competition law infringement to bring a legal 
action before a court.
14
 It should be noted that “the cause of action [for EU competition law 
damages] is a mixture of EU law and […] ‘domestic’ law”.15 First as a matter of EU law it 
must be shown that an entity is in breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Secondly, it must be 
shown, as a matter of domestic law, that an entity, which is recognised by a Member State’s 
law, is liable in damages to this particular injured party for that breach.  
Different Member States may adopt different solutions with regard to the appropriate 
measure of damages in an EU competition law claim. Although the principle of national 
procedural autonomy is subject to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, the 
Member States would enjoy procedural autonomy to decide on the relevant procedural rules 
and remedies in so far as they do not make ‘practically impossible or excessively difficult the 
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exercise of rights conferred by EU law’.16 Given the fact that the problem is not dealt with at 
the EU level, the principle of national procedural autonomy
17
 might suggest not only that it is 
for a national domestic system to deal with the issue of damages, but also that it is for national 
law to decide what would be the set of procedural rules which would be employed in this 
context. The lack of harmonisation may suggest that the EU competition law claims may be 
characterised by a high level of uncertainty
18
 in so far as such claims would be often cross-
border in nature which suggests that “knowledge of [several] legal systems is required”.19 It 
has been submitted that “[i]t is troublesome for the litigants who will have to go through the 
often difficult procedure of ascertaining and applying foreign law. In many cases, the 
variation of the substantive laws in Europe is a true non-tariff trade barrier.”20  
Previous comparative studies - revealed by the Ashurst Report
21
 as well as by the 
Collective Antitrust Redress Report
22
 – strongly suggest that harmonisation must be 
considered by the EU legislator.
23
 The academic debate was recently renewed by the authors 
of the collective redress report who made a case for procedural harmonisation
24
 at EU level.
25
 
Such a deduction can be further strengthened by noting that “it is readily apparent that 
inadequate national remedies and procedural rules can frustrate the effective application of 
[EU] law within each Member State.”26 In other words, some form of procedural 
harmonisation may be justified by the need to avoid anomaly allowing the different Member 
State courts to award different amounts of damages with regard to the same type of breach of 
the same EU competition law provision. Professors Weatherill and Beaumont have noted that 
“[a] situation where the application of [European Union] law varies significantly from 
member state to member state would be a denial of the rule of law and would make the 
                                                 
16
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[Union] untenable. However, the European Court’s attempt to accommodate differences in 
national procedural law means that some variations will occur.”27 
The European Commission has agreed upon a package of legislative proposals with a 
view to providing for an effective EU competition law enforcement regime in Europe.
28
 More 
specifically, the Commission has put forward a proposal for a Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.
29
 The corrigendum of the text of 
the Directive, which was adopted by the European Parliament, was very recently formally 
approved by the EU Council of Ministers.
30
 The Directive is complemented by a 
Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress in 
the Member States concerning violation of rights granted under Union Law
31
 as well as by a 
Communication on quantifying harm in actions based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.
32
 In this context, the European Commission has justified approximation of national 
substantive and procedure rules at EU level as follows:  
“To ensure a more level playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market and to 
improve the conditions for injured parties to exercise the rights they derive from the internal 
market, it is therefore appropriate to increase legal certainty and to reduce the differences 
between the Member States as to the national rules governing actions for antitrust damages”33  
 
How appropriately may the level of variation with regard to the various national 
regimes be addressed by the Directive for antitrust damage actions? The authors demonstrate 
that a major challenge for the policy-makers relates to the governance aspects of EU 
competition law litigation
34
 which must be addressed head-on with a view to closing the 
enforcement gap in a cross-border context. In light of the current Damages Actions 
Initiative,
35
 this article demonstrates that the EU legislator should carefully consider what 
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mode of “governance”36 should be used with a view to setting up an effective enforcement 
regime in Europe, and addressing the specific problems that arise in a cross-border context. 
The European Commission
37
 has identified the five principles, which would be essential for 
an appropriately designed good governance system, as being “openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence.”38 In his analysis of the new modes of EU 
governance, Armstrong has noted that “[t]here is a relative agreement on ‘hierarchy’ or 
‘competition’ as distinct modes of governance.”39 Furthermore, Muir-Watt and Arroyo’s 
forthcoming edited book “explores the potential of private international law to reassert a 
significant governance function in respect of new forms of authority beyond the state.”40 
With this in mind, a choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition 
actions may be the key for closing the enforcement gap in Europe. In this context, one should 
make a distinction between a unified/centralised system (which might include 
unified/hierarchical enforcement regime), on the one hand, and a level of managed 
harmonisation (setting up common principles and minimum standards) which presupposes an 
effectively functioning private international law regime, on the other hand. Bearing in mind 
this distinction, one could say that a private international law regime which promotes inter-
jurisdictional regulatory competition should be used as a new mode of governance, in order to 
complement the proposed legislative package in the area of EU competition law. Although it 
could be questioned to some extent whether it is relevant to refer to “regulatory competition” 
in the area as long as the relevant EU competition law requires a uniform interpretation as a 
matter of EU law, the cross-border nature of EU competition law infringements and the level 
of variation regarding the conditions for bringing such actions
41
 as well as the important role 
of Member States cumulatively suggest that some Member States’ courts might be better 
equipped (than others) to deal with such actions. Hence, a private international law regime, 
which promotes inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition, might be a useful mode of 
                                                 
36
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37
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39
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governance in the light of cross-border aspects of EU competition law infringements. In spite 
of the fact that injured parties (i.e. consumers and business) may be suffering harm caused by 
EU competition law infringements in a number of Member States, a unified/centralised 
system (which might include unified/hierarchical enforcement regime) is hard to achieve at 
EU level because “the EU is characterised by a low level of division of labour, limited 
cognitive resources and high decisional costs.”42 A recent commentator has noted that:  
“a new school of thought […] portrays the EU as a ‘multi-level system of governance.’ This 
analysis highlights the erosion of nation-states, denies, however, their transformation into a 
new European super state. The concept of governance used is flexible enough both firmly to 
capture certain sui generis characteristics of the emerging European polity such as its lack of 
internal hierarchy and its reliance upon ‘Law’, and to leave open the question of exactly where 
the European system lies on a scale between the traditional nation-state and looser forms of 
international co-operation.”43 
  
The question whether an efficient EU private international law framework could be 
important “for the functioning of the internal market, and at the same time for the preservation 
of diversity in national private law”44 should be investigated in the light of the multi-level 
governance system in the EU. Private international law instruments are normally seen as an 
appropriate legislative tool, which may be used to preserve the inherent characteristics of the 
diverse legal systems within the EU, but can PIL be used as a mode of governance which 
promotes regulatory competition
45
 in cross-border competition cases? Before addressing this 
question, the employed research methodology will be briefly introduced. Then, the main 
modes of governance available will be introduced along with the challenges the EU policy-
                                                 
42
 PF Kjaer, Between Governing and Governance: On the Emergence, Function and Form of Europe’s Post-
National Constellation, (Hart Publishing, 2010), 37. 
43
 C Joerges, “The impact of European integration on private law: Reductionist perceptions, true conflicts and a 
new constitutional perspective” in C Joerges and O Gerstenberg (eds), COST A7 – Private governance, 
democratic constitutionalism and supranationalism (Office for Official Publications of the European 
Community, Luxembourg 1998) 69, 79; C Joerges, ”European challenges to private law: On false dichotomies, 
true conflicts and the need for a constitutional perspective” (1998) 18 Legal Studies 146 Compare: A Moravcsik, 
”Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach” (1993) 31 
Journal of Common Market Studies 473; G Marks, L Hooghe and K Blank, ”European integration from the 
1980s: State-centric v. Multi-level governance” (1996) 34 Journal of Common Market Studies 342; S Milio, 
From Policy to Implementation in the European Union: The Challenge of a Multi-Level Governance System 
(I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2010); M Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law: Co-
ordinating EU Social Law and Polity (CUP, 2011); D Augenstein (ed), ‘Integration through Law’ Revisited: The 
Making of the European Polity (Ashgate, 2013).  
44
 A Furrer, ”European law without peak and centre? Observations on the Europanization process in private law 
towards a supranational multi-level system” in Joerges and Gerstenberg, supra n 43, 167, 184. 
45
 H Muir-Watt, ”European integration, legal diversity and the conflict of laws” (2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review 
6, 7. See also H Muir-Watt, Aspects économiques du droit international privé  (Recueil des Cours de l’Académie 
de la Haye, 2005); H Muir-Watt, ”Integration and diversity: The Conflict of Laws as a Regulatory Tool” in F 
Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP, 2006) 107; L Tichy, ”A new role for 
private international law and procedural law in European Integration? A critical comment” in R Brownsword, H-
W Micklitz, L Niglia and S Weatherill (eds), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 
393 – 412; A Mills, ”Federalism in the European Union and the United States: Subsidiarity, Private Law, and the 
Conflict of Laws” (2010-1) 32 University of Pennsylvania Journal of  International Law 369-455; D Lasok and 
PA Stone, Conflict of Laws in the European Community (Professional Books Limited, 1987) 144 – 145. 
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makers face when devising a policy governing the cross-border EU competition law 
enforcement activities. After that, the important issues which affect the claimants/defendants’ 
tactics will be specified. On this basis, the authors will propose a theoretical model which 
may be used to govern cross-border EU competition law enforcement activities with a view to 
closing the enforcement gap and providing redress for those who have suffered harm as a 
result of an EU competition law infringement. Finally, some issues, which need to be 
considered in a wider European context, will be put forward. 
 
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY46 
Since the paper aims to consider the choice of governance design of cross-border EU 
competition law actions, it is important to use a research methodology which allows the 
authors to define the cross-border competition litigation pattern.
47
 Indeed, the cross-border 
nature of many EU competition law infringements seemingly suggests that the way the 
current framework shapes the claimants’ tactics would be important with a view to making a 
case for reform (and identifying an appropriate mode of governance
48
).  
In addition to employing traditional library based legal research methods, the authors 
thought that it would be useful to have the opinions of policy-makers and legal practitioners, 
to consider their views on how private EU competition law actions are functioning at the 
moment and how they could and should be developed. Indeed, part of the problem, which is 
identified by some of the studies
49
 so far, is that there are not many cases at present.
50
 Given 
that the study aims to identify how the cross-border EU competition law actions should be 
accommodated in Europe, qualitative interviews
51
 were conducted with legal practitioners in 
                                                 
46
 See also M Danov and F Becker, ”Research Methodology” in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 25-31. 
47
 D Chalmers and M Chaves, ”The reference points of EU judicial politics” in SK Schmidt and R D Kelemen 
(eds), The Power of the European Court of Justice (Routledge, 2013)  25. 
48
 Armstrong, supra n 36. 
49
 Ashurst Report, supra n 4; Collective Redress in Antitrust, supra n 4. 
50
 Compare: the UK report delivered as a part of the Ashurst Study < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/national_reports/united_kingdom_en.pdf > (last visited 
10 June 2013). 
51
 The interview questions focused on six key areas: 1) General questions about competition law disputes; 2) 
Plaintiffs’ tactics in cross-border EU competition law cases; 3) Defendants’ tactics and settlement; 4) Follow-on 
actions and quantification of damages; 5) Procedural issues; 6) Policy issues. These provided a structure to 
interviews. That said, the interviewer and/or interviewee were always free to depart from the structure if the 
participants’ viewpoints and experience were thereby better expressed. See also SA Richardson, BS Dohrenwend 
and D Klein, Interviewing: its forms and functions (Basic Books, 1965)  45; RK Merton and PL Kendall, “The 
Focused Interview”, (1946) 51 American Journal of Sociology  541, 541-2; NK Denzim, The Research Act: A 
Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (Prentice Hall, 1989) 105. 
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Germany and England
52
 (in so far as both countries appear to be attracting EU competition 
law actions
53
) as well as with policy-makers in Brussels. 
The inclusion of the two categories (legal practitioners and policy-makers) can be 
justified as follows. First, the practicing lawyers from Germany and England are well placed 
to be asked questions regarding both consumer claims and claims by undertakings. Given the 
fact that the Georgetown project on private antitrust litigation appears to suggest that ‘the vast 
majority of cases, possibly as many as 88 percent in [their] sample, settle before trial’, it 
seems clear that the legal practitioners would have some useful insights as to how EU 
competition law litigation is functioning at present.
54
 Indeed, legal practitioners were well 
placed to provide us with information about litigation strategies.
55
 Secondly, the paper 
examines possible proposals for the reform of the European Civil Justice system the best to 
accommodate the post-2003 policy of the EU favouring private law enforcement of EU 
competition law. The views of EU officials from Brussels are therefore very important; 
indeed, it has been submitted that the EU would have competence to legislate,
56
 and in view 
of the cross-border nature of EU competition law actions any legislative reform might be most 
effective at the EU level.
57
  
The authors randomly
58
 selected participants from each class (legal practitioners and 
policy-makers), ensuring that the views of respondents were representative. Lawyers were 
randomly selected from the legal directories where they have featured on the basis of their 
                                                 
52
 P Legrand, “Against a European Civil Code” (1997) 62 Modern Law Review 44. 
53
 Jurisdictions with low enforcement levels were not included because part of the point is that there are not 
many cases anywhere. (See Ashurst Report, supra n 4; Collective Redress in Antitrust, supra n 4.) Hence, there 
was a need to do the interviews in countries where the claimants are relatively active, assuming that, on the basis 
of their practical experience, legal practitioners (from jurisdictions with high enforcement levels) could have 
valuable insights to share with us.  
54
 See S Salop and L White, “Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework” in L White (ed), 
Private Antitrust Litigation, New Evidence, New Learning (MIT Press, 1988) 1, 23. Case No 1077/5/7/07: Order 
of the Competition Appeal Tribunal – Withdrawn Claim – 11 April 2013. See also B Rodger, “Private 
enforcement of competition law, the hidden story: competition litigation settlements in the United Kingdom, 
2000-2005”, (2008) 29 European Competition Law Review 96; B Rodger, “Competition law litigation in the UK 
courts: a study of all cases 2005-2008: Part I”, (2009) 2 Global Competition Litigation Review 93; B Rodger, 
“Competition law litigation in the UK courts: a study of all cases 2005-2008: Part II”, (2009) 3 Global 
Competition Litigation Review 136. 
55
 It is well established that ‘private litigation is part of larger overall system consisting of four distinct phases: 
the business conduct of potential litigants, the suing decision of potential plaintiffs, the settlement offers of the 
litigants once a dispute has arisen, and the litigation strategies and expenditures of both parties if settlement 
cannot be reached.’ Salop and White, supra n 54, 16. 
56
 F Rizzuto, “Does the European Community have legal competence to harmonise national procedural rules 
governing private actions for damages for infringements of European Community antitrust rules” (2009) Global 
Competition Litigation Review 29. Compare From the Board, “Two steps forward and one step back: 
harmonizing the unharmonizable”, (2011) 38 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 207-211. 
57
 See Article 81 TFEU. See also: P Beaumont and P McEleavy, Private International Law, Anton (3
rd
 ed, 
SULI/W Green,  2011)  16-17. 
58
 WJ Goode and PK Hatt, Methods in Social Research (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952)  214. 
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experience in competition law. The sample of UK solicitors and barristers was drawn from 
the relevant sections of the Legal 500
59
 and Chambers and Partners.
60
 The sample of German 
lawyers was drawn from the relevant sections of JUVE Handbuch.
61
 From the European 
Commission, the sample was drawn from the relevant sections of the published personnel list. 
We included officials from the Legal Service within the European Commission as well as 
from both DG Competition
62
 and Justice,
63
 as the issues in the project concern both 
competition policy and cross-border civil justice. In England, this resulted in a list of 338 
people working as European Commission officials or legal practitioners in the area of EU and 
competition law, and 192 individuals were randomly selected as potential participants. In 
Germany, the random selection resulted in a sample of the 35 most respected lawyers in the 
area of competition law selected as potential participants. Safeguards were observed to ensure 
the best possible data quality and compliance with good research practices and ethical 
norms.
64
 19 interviews involving 25 participants were conducted with legal practitioners in 
England and Wales, and 3 interviews involving 3 participants were conducted with policy-
makers in Brussels from March to September 2011. 11 interviews involving 17 participants 
were conducted with legal practitioners in Germany from September 2011 to August 2012.
65
 
                                                 
59
 Legal 500, editorial on London solicitors’ EU and Competition practice at 
http://www.legal500.com/c/london/corporate-and-commercial/eu-and-competition (last visited 21 March 2012). 
60
 Chambers and Partners, list of London solicitors practicing in Competition/European Law at 
http://www.chambersandpartners.com/UK/Editorial/38977 (last visited 21 March 2012). 
61
 JUVE Handbuch Führende Namen im Kartellrecht at 
http://www.juve.de/handbuch/de/2011/fuehrendenamen/24250 (last visited 6 August 2012). 
62
 DG Comp personnel directory at 
http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_www.branch?pLang=EN&pId=313&pDisplayAll=0 (last visited 21 March 
2012). 
63
 DG Justice personnel directory at 
http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_www.branch?pLang=EN&pId=9151&pDisplayAll=0 (last visited 21 
March 2012). 
64
 Each potential participant was informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding and institutional affiliations 
of the researchers. Participants’ informed consent was always sought before each interview; participants also 
signed a consent declaration. Participants were all over the age of 18 and engaged in a professional occupation, 
and were therefore in a position to decline a request for informed consent if they so wished. To ensure that 
participants could speak freely, they were also informed of the right to abstain from participation in the study or 
to withdraw consent to participate at any time without penalty. Every precaution was taken to respect and 
safeguard the privacy of each participant, and the confidentiality of each participant’s information. All personal 
information was rendered anonymous as far as is possible and consistent with the needs of the study, and as early 
as possible in the data processing. Even though several participants were employed by large law firms, they 
could be expected to provide a fair account because of this anonymity, and their professionalism. 
65
 Although some of the interviews involved more than one respondent, we decided that it would be only fair to 
count each interview as one case for data analysis purposes, although the separation of responses from different 
participants was always maintained. 
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In addition, the authors took account of the primary data available on the European 
Commission web site
66
 as well as of the recent comparative data disclosed in the study 
requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.67  
That said, it should be clearly noted that the so gathered empirical data will be only 
briefly presented in this paper with a view to producing a theoretical model, which does 
consider the choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions by 
addressing the specific issues that affect the litigants’ strategies. As a result, it is not the 
intention of this article to present the empirical data systematically as this has been  done in 
an edited collection of papers produced within the project framework,
68
 but it rather aims to 
consider the choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions. 
 
C. GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER EU COMPETITION LAW LITIGATION: 
MAIN CHALLENGES FOR POLICY-MAKERS 
Before looking at the main issues which affect the suing decisions of potential litigants, the 
main challenges, which affect the governance aspects of cross-border competition litigation, 
will be presented. A difficult task for the EU policy-makers in the area of competition law 
(similarly, as the one for the EU
69
 itself) is the process of creation of a European enforcement 
regime “which is based on the existing diversity of member states”’70 legal orders.  
The fact that the cause of action for EU competition law damages is a mixture of EU 
law and Member States’ laws may be justified by the “political and legal reality” in the 
Union.
71
 The latter aims to strike a balance between the requirement of consistent 
enforcement of EU competition law across Europe, on the one hand, and the Member States’ 
competence in matters of procedure broadly defined to cover the issues of causation and 
                                                 
66
 See more: EUROPA – European Commission – Competition, “National Judgments” < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/antitrust/nationalcourts/ > (last accessed 10 June 2013). See also: S. 
Peyer, 'Myths and Untold Stories - Private Antitrust Enforcement in Germany' (2010) < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672695& > (last accessed 1 May 2012). 
67
 Collective Redress in Antitrust, supra n 4. 
68
 See more: Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2. 
69
 J Shaw, ”Postnational constitutionalism in the European Union” (1999) Journal of European Public Policy 
579, 586. 
70
 Ibid. See more specifically: J Lawrence, ”Seeking the Perfect Balance: Some Reflections on the Commission’s 
Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules” in CD Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels (Hart Publishing, 2007) 457, 
460-476.   
71
 W Van Gerven, “Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures” (2000) Common Market Law Review 501, 521. 
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remedies, on the other hand.
72
 However, is such an approach not prone to undermine the 
consistent application of EU competition law across Europe? Should there be a special regime 
for cross-border EU competition law actions? What should be the new mode of governance in 
the area? 
1. A Non-PIL Mode of Governance: Harmonisation of Substantive/Procedure 
Laws 
One mode of governance would be more harmonisation (rather than the use of private 
international law instruments) in the area with a view to achieving “a degree of harmonisation 
of fundamental concepts of national civil law (both substantive and procedural)”.73 It is well 
established that ‘[t]he purpose of [Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II] is clearly the unification 
of private international law, not the harmonisation of the substantive laws of the Member 
States, on which it may be more difficult to reach agreement.’74 However, Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, forming part of each Member State’s legal order, are not only harmonised, but 
also at the heart of an EU competition law claim, so that the use of private international law in 
cross-border private antitrust proceedings may be questioned. Hence, a case for employing 
such a non-PIL mode of governance can certainly be made for cases where “cartel agreements 
or abuses of a dominant position affect inter-State commerce”75 by pointing out that Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, forming part of each Member State’s legal order are already unified.  
The German Government and Bundeskartellamt “cannot discern any convincing reason 
for special private law and civil procedure rules for enforcing antitrust law. [...] Damages 
actions [...] are largely enforced on the basis of general provisions that are in many ways 
fundamentally different in the various Member States.”76 However, does the fact that EU 
competition law provisions are to be applied in a multi-level system of governance (which 
includes the European Commission, national competition authorities and national courts) not 
suggest that there is a need for a special legislative instrument to be used in this context? 
                                                 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 Ashurst Report, supra n 4, 131. 
74
 A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (CUP, 2009) 185. See also Council of the 
European Union, ‘The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf 31. 
75
 W Van Gerven, “Bringing (private) laws closer to each other at the European level” in F Cafaggi (ed.), The 
Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP, 2006) 37, 66. 
76
 Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection and the Bundeskartellamt on the EU Commission's 
White Paper on 'Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules' (Courtesy Translation) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/bund_en.pdf > 3. See also J 
Kortmann and C Swaak, ”The EC White Paper on Antitrust Damage Actions: Why the Member States are (right 
to be) less than Enthusiastic” (2009) European Competition Law Review 340 
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Indeed, the EU legislator has adopted a special Regulation 1/2003 which is meant to 
ensure that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are applied effectively and uniformly across Europe.
77
 
It has been clearly stated that “in order to ensure compliance with the principles of legal 
certainty and the uniform application of the Community competition rules in a system of 
parallel powers, conflicting decisions must be avoided.”78 If EU competition law provisions 
are at the heart of an EU competition law claim, then a harmonised instrument might be used 
to lay down the conditions for bringing EU competition law damages actions across Europe. 
The European Commission’s proposed Directive “modifies the applicable national rules 
concerning the right to claim damages for infringements of […] competition law.”79 But, may 
the Union achieve harmonisation with regard to substantive and procedural rules with a view 
to setting up an effective enforcement regime? 
Some commentators have noted that a legal regime for EU competition law damages 
actions adopted at EU level may potentially impact on the “internal coherence of [Member 
States’ domestic] systems of private and procedural law.”80 Moreover, the diverse legal 
traditions and heritages of the countries forming the European Union
81
 might suggest that the 
level of variation may remain unchanged after the adoption of such a harmonised regime in 
Europe. This is so because “common principles of interpretation and a common legal culture” 
take some time to develop.
82
 It seems that this could be an issue in a Union which has recently 
enlarged to encompass 28 Member States.  
More importantly, a harmonised instrument without an appropriate institutional 
structure might bring fresh uncertainty across Europe. It has been submitted that:  
“in the absence of a federal court system, it will not be possible to ensure consistent 
interpretation, application and enforcement of [any harmonised instrument].  
All these problems of consistency and effectiveness are, of course, exacerbated by the fact that 
Europe is multilingual territory.”83  
 
                                                 
77
 See Recitals 1-8 of Council Regulation No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Arts 101 and 102 TFEU. 
78
 Recital 22 of Regulation 1/2003. 
79
 Explanatory Memorandum - Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions, 10. 
80
 Kortmann and Swaak, supra n 76, 347. 
81
 The delay may be a problem in some countries (e.g. Italy - Cooper Tire, supra  n 10, [54-55] EWCA). The 
lack of experience of the judiciary could be a problem in other countries (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania - eg 
Commission (EC), ‘Bulgaria’s progress on accompanying measures following Accession’ (Report) COM (2007) 
377 final; Commission (EC), ‘Romania’s progress on accompanying measures following Accession’ (Report) 
COM (2007) 378 final. See also: Reports on Progress in Bulgaria and Romania < 
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm > (last visited 10 June 2013). 
82
 T Andersson, ”Approximation of procedural law in Europe” in M Storme (ed), Procedural Laws in Europe 
(Maklu, 2003) 55, 64-65. 
83
 Collins, supra n 19, 183. 
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Furthermore, the study on Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU 
unequivocally indicates that exemplary damages
84
 as well as the various collective redress 
mechanisms (any opt-out rule in particular)
85
 that could be put into effect by legislative 
measures may result in significant harmonisation costs. It has been submitted by Kerber
86
 that 
“collective decision-making implies large costs such as knowledge, rent-seeking problems, 
inefficiencies, or inflexibility.”87 In other words, one might question the effectiveness of more 
centralisation in the area of private antitrust enforcement by devising another legislative 
instrument which is the result of a compromise reached at EU level. Indeed, the recently 
proposed Directive clearly suggests that adoption of a unified/cenrtalised system (which 
might include a unified/hierarchical enforcement regime) is not on the agenda for anyone. 
2. A PIL Mode of Governance: Inter-jurisdictional Regulatory Competition  
Another mode of governance may be promoting regulatory competition. Such a mode of 
governance pre-supposes two elements. First, common principles may be set up by the EU 
policy-makers with a view to encouraging the Member States to legislate. Secondly, an 
efficient PIL regime must ensure that there is inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the 
area of EU antitrust law dispute resolution which, by definition, would affect claimants and 
businesses in a number of Member States. Indeed, a set of harmonised private international 
law rules
88
 have been consistently employed by the EU legislator as a mode of governance 
which promotes judicial cooperation between the various Member States’ legal systems.89 
The use of PIL mechanisms allows Member States to adopt different solutions. At the same 
time, claimants can show their preferences (by bringing their claim in one jurisdiction instead 
of another) promoting competition between legal orders, and fostering the learning process 
across Europe.
90
 Such a “perspective would damn harmonisation itself as anti-competitive.”91 
Weatherill has claimed that “in a geographically and functionally expanded European Union 
the establishment of common rules is not only increasingly difficult to achieve, it is also 
                                                 
84
 Report for the European Commission, Contract DG COMP/2006/A3/012, Making Antitrust Damages Actions 
More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf > p 236. 
85
 Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU, supra n 84, pp 311 and 316-317. 
86
 W Kerber, ”Interjurisdictional competition within the European Union” (1999-2000) 23 Fordham 
International Law Journal S217. 
87
 Ibid S229 
88
 Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II. 
89
 See Art 81 TFEU. Compare: RH Graveson, ”Problems of Private International Law in Non-Unified Legal 
Systems” in RH Graveson, Comparative Conflict of Laws: Selected Essays (Vol 1, North-Holand Publishing, 
1977) 305, 306-7 
90
 From the Board, supra n 56, 211. 
91
 S Weatherill, ”Why harmonise?” in T Tridimas and P Nebbia (eds), European Union Law for the Twenty-First 
Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, Vol. 2, (Hart Publishing, 2004) 11, 14. 
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increasingly undesirable as a suppression of competitive and cultural diversity.”92 What are 
the aspects, which must be considered in this context? Are any of them addressed by the 
recently proposed Directive?  
If the current litigation pattern suggests  that “[t]he obstacles are mainly procedural”93, 
then one should say that procedural matters are best addressed at national level as the EU 
legislator’s intervention in these matters would bring fresh uncertainty. Indeed, the point was 
clearly noted by the European Commission:  
“A Directive requires Member States to achieve the objectives and implement the measures 
into their national substantive and procedural law systems. This approach gives the Member 
States more freedom when implementing an EU measure than does a Regulation, in that 
Member States are left the choice of the most appropriate means of implementing the measure 
in the Directive. This allows Member States to ensure that these new rules are consistent with 
their existing substantive and procedural framework”94 
 
Hence, the Union policy-maker appears to believe that a national legislator may be best 
placed to “devise an institutional architecture of competition law enforcement [at national 
level] which encourages the claims, where there is really harm to the market and the process 
of competition, and creates safeguards against claims where companies might be using the 
system for a variety of purposes not necessarily beneficial to the market and the process of 
competition.”95 The impression that the issues are to be predominantly dealt with by national 
legislators across Europe is reinforced by the Commission Recommendation on collective 
redress which states: 
“The aim of this Recommendation is to facilitate access to justice in relation to violations of 
rights under Union law and to that end to recommend that all Member States should have 
collective redress systems at national level that follow the same basic principles throughout the 
Union, taking into account the legal traditions of the Member States and safeguarding against 
abuse.”96  
 
Given the level of diversity across Europe, the Commission Recommendation and 
Directive may effectively encourage inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area. 
However, it should be noted that a regulatory competition with regard to cross-border 
damages claims may be only promoted if injured parties can directly choose between 
damages regimes of different jurisdictions and bring their claims there by benefitting from 
                                                 
92
 Weatherill, supra n 91. 
93
 N Khan, ‘Damages for breaches of competition law’ at the Conference on ‘Remedies for Breach of EU Law 
Revisited’ held at King’s College London on 18th June 2010 < http://ukael.org/past_events_24_1030208799.pdf 
> (last visited 10 June 2013). See also: Danov and Dnes, supra n 8; Kammin and Becker, supra n 8. 
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 Explanatory Memorandum - Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions, 12. 
95
 M Danov and S Dnes, 'Private actions in competition law: a consultation on options for reform. Response 
form' submitted to the UK Government, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on 24 July 2012. 
96
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procedural/substantive laws of the jurisdiction where the claim is brought by relying on the 
law of the forum (lex fori).
97
  
The possibility for regulatory competition in Europe with regard to EU competition law 
damages claims was first signalled by the authors of the report Making Antitrust Damages 
Actions More Effective in the EU.
98
 Although the authors of the report appear to be placing a 
significant importance on the applicable laws under Rome II, Article 1(3) states that the 
Regulation does not apply to evidence and procedure. Establishing jurisdiction in one forum 
rather than another would be important in so far as this would indicate the set of procedural 
rules which should apply in this context.
99
 The significance of the law of the forum could be 
further strengthened by making reference to Art 6(3)(b) of Rome II which allows a private 
antitrust claimant to base his claim on lex fori in cases where the markets in several countries 
have been affected.
100
 It should be noted that when one talks about EU competition law 
actions, it is not “competition between competition laws”101 (as suggested by the authors of 
the report Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU
102
), but, since Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU enjoy direct effect in all the Member States, it is rather promoting 
competition between the different jurisdictions for laying down conditions for bringing such 
actions. Such conditions might include, for example, the various rules related to the pre-trial 
discovery and the availability of opt-out collective redress proceedings and/or 
exemplary/punitive damages
103
 as well as the speed of the legal proceedings and the 
experience of judges in the different jurisdictions. 
Given the diverse nature of the European Union, it seems that inter-jurisdictional 
regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust law dispute resolution may be best 
employed by the EU legislator as a new mode of governance which might produce efficient 
enforcement results in a multi-level system. In this way, strong jurisdictions for bringing 
cross-border EU competition law actions might emerge. An increased number of claims might 
be seen in some Member States. But, what if there are market failures driven by externalities 
                                                 
97
 See Type (IV)-regulatory competition via free choice of law as described in W Kerber and O Budzinski, 
”Towards a differentiated analysis of competition of competition laws” (2003) ZWeR – Journal of Competition 
Law 411, 415. 
98
 Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU, supra n 84, 555-556. 
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 M Illmer, ”Neutrality matters―some thoughts about the Rome Regulations and the so-called dichotomy of 
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100
 See more Danov, supra n 1, Ch 5. See also J. Fitchen, ”The Applicable Law in Cross-Border Competition 
Law Actions and Article 6(3) of Regulation 864/2007” in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 297-328; H 
Mercer, “Applicable Law in Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions - Forum Shopping, Mandatory Rules 
and Public Policy” in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 329-336; Basedow, Francq and Idot, supra n 2. 
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102
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or lack of mobility of market participants?
104
 Externalities could be one cause for market 
failure when it comes to inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust 
law dispute resolution in the European context. It is well established that:  
‘Weak enforcement of antitrust rules [...] in one nation may have a negative impact on the 
profits of foreign based producers whose products are thereby squeezed out of the market. To 
the extent that these spillover effects are not based on market-clearing effects, but rather driven 
by strategic behaviour, suboptimal results must be antiticipated. To avoid welfare losses and 
market distortions, such externalities must be corrected through some form of 
interjurisdictional collective action.’105 
  
Hence, in addition to the proposed Directive, the EU intervention, on the basis of 
Article 81 TFEU, might be required as the cross-border implications of many EU competition 
law actions would make any national legislation less than effective in the EU context.
106
 In 
particular, the inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition market would fail to address the 
current enforcement gap if there are high cross-border litigation costs and lack of information 
as to the various rules across Europe, and if there is no mobility of the consumers and SMEs, 
who have suffered damages as a result of an EU competition law infringement.
107
 If these 
issues are not addressed, then the inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition would lead to 
economic externalities - giving rise to welfare losses and market distortions
108
 - across Europe 
unless the EU legislator implements a new mode of governance, which pre-supposes an 
effective private international law regime, with a view to allowing for Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU to be efficiently enforced across Europe.  
Kerber and Budzinski have put forward that “[t]he working properties of regulatory 
competition seem to depend crucially on specific preconditions, the institutional framework 
for regulatory competition, and the kind of legal rules and regulations itself.”109 Whilst, the 
private international law framework (and its clarity) will certainly have an important role to 
play when it comes to selecting where to litigate (or even whether to litigate at all), the cross-
border litigation costs may affect the mobility of the injured parties (or at least some of the 
injured parties). These costs/risks could be multiplied if the institutional framework is 
allowing for parallel proceedings with regard to the same infringement and/or if the 
regulator’s decision establishing an infringement is not really useful in a subsequent follow-
on damages claim. 
                                                 
104
 DC Esty and D Geradin, ”Regulatory Co-Operation” in DC Esty and D Geradin (eds), Regulatory 
Competition and Economic Integration (OUP, 2001) 30, 32-40. 
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 Esty and Geradin, supra n 104, 34. 
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Can the policy-makers achieve a level of managed harmonisation (setting up common 
principles and minimum standards) by relying on an effectively functioning private 
international law regime? An analysis of the litigants’ strategies might be useful in identifying 
what the appropriate mode of governance is as well as in indicating the course of the potential 
reform. How does the current mode of governance shape the litigants’ strategies? What are 
the main issues which affect the suing decisions of potential litigants?  
 
D. THE CURRENT MODE OF GOVERNANCE: ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED 
As the current regime appears to be shaping litigants strategies, in this section, a brief 
summary will be provided of the qualitative interview data
110
 which may be indicative as to 
the important issues which appear to be affecting and shaping the litigants’ tactics under the 
current regime. An analysis of the current mode of governance of cross-border EU litigation 
appears to suggest that there are three main aspects which are seemingly important for the 
policy-makers to consider with a view to providing for the “effective enforcement of EU 
competition law”.111 First, the problems surrounding two-step adjudication structure, in which 
arguably a regulator is better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, 
a court is better placed to award damages,
112
 should be identified under the current 
competition law enforcement regime. Secondly, the problems surrounding the jurisdictional 
differences and litigants’ strategies must be considered. Thirdly, the specific problems 
regarding consumer claims must be considered with a view to close the enforcement gap in 
Europe. 
 
1. The Enforcement Pattern and Litigants’ Strategies in the EU Context  
In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposed Directive for antitrust damages 
actions, the European Commission has noted that “[t]he overall enforcement of the EU 
competition rules is best guaranteed through complementary public and private enforcement. 
However, the existing legal framework does not properly regulate the interaction between the 
                                                 
110
 See more Danov and Dnes, supra n 8; Kammin and Becker, supra n 8. 
111
 Explanatory Memorandum - Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions, 2. 
112
 WPJ Wils, ”The relationship between public antitrust enforcement and private actions for damages” (2009) 
32 World Competition 3, 18 – accessible < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296458 >. See 
more below. 
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two strands of EU competition law enforcement.”113 How does the current enforcement 
pattern affect litigants’ strategies?  
In an analysis of the current institutional architecture of EU competition law 
enforcement, Wils has noted:  
“public antitrust enforcement is the superior instrument to pursue the objectives of clarification 
and development of the law and of deterrence and punishment, whereas private actions for 
damages are superior for the pursuit of corrective justice through compensation, then the 
optimal antitrust enforcement would appear to be a system in which public antitrust 
enforcement aims at clarification and development of the law and at deterrence and 
punishment, while private actions for damages aim at compensation.”114  
 
Such a two-step adjudication process, which according to Wils
115
 appears to be also 
adopted in the White Paper for damages,
116
 would give rise to several problems in a cross-
border context in Europe. In particular, the antitrust authorities across Europe would not have 
the resources to detect and pursue all EU competition law infringements, and, as a result, 
there may be an enforcement gap as the private litigation would follow-on the regulator’s 
decision. That said, one might object to that by saying that there is no two-step adjudication 
model explicitly (or deliberately) devised by policy-makers in so far as Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU have direct effect, and as a result the courts may well establish an infringement and 
award damages. Hence, there may be a need to consider the litigants’ strategies which may 
indicate as to what is the prevailing enforcement pattern at present.    
Although, the qualitative interview data appear to suggest that competition litigation is 
picking up in England as well as in Germany, a closer look at the collected data shows that 
the majority of the participants are of the view that the increase is only in respect of follow-on 
actions. This view re-appeared despite the fact that the interview questions were broadly 
drafted and there were no questions which were asking the participants whether the increase is 
in respect of follow-on or standalone actions. Despite this, the respondents from England and 
Brussels clearly stated on 13 occasions that the follow-on actions are the ones picking up;
117
 
so too was stated by four respondents from Germany.
118
 The impression is reinforced by the 
most recent English case law
119
 which clearly underlines that the private competition law 
claims are preceded by a finding of an infringement by a regulator. 
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The prevalent strategy employed by injured parties clearly indicates that the current 
enforcement pattern is characterised by a two-step adjudication. It should be noted that the 
respondents were asked if a person, who is adversely affected by an infringement, would 
launch a complaint with a competition authority or whether he would rather bring a private 
action and seek damages before national courts. It appears that the majority of the participants 
expresses the view that going to the competition authority first would be a normal strategy. 
This view was expressed on 14 occasions in England,
120
 and on eight occasions in 
Germany.
121
 Indeed, one respondent from Germany observed that “[…] starting a civil law 
proceeding without any clear decision by any competition authority is almost impossible.” 
This participant even stated he has never been involved in a stand-alone action. Only one 
participant from Germany was not convinced that it is necessary to wait for a competition 
authority’s decision as“[…] you need to go to the court anyway”. But the same respondent 
backtracked later on and emphasised that he“[…] would certainly not advise a client to file a 
stand-alone lawsuit with respect to hard core cartels.”  
Therefore, there is clearly a two-step adjudication, in which arguably a regulator is 
better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, a court is better 
placed to award damages.
122
 The current enforcement pattern affects litigants’ tactics in a 
number of ways. First, the private litigation which occurs normally proceeds as a follow-on 
action based on a public enforcement action. Secondly, the defendants appear to be 
employing a number of delaying strategies raising preliminary issues in the course of private 
antitrust proceedings. If the two-step adjudication model is not functioning efficiently, then 
there would be a level of legal uncertainty and evidential hurdles which could be due to the 
institutional design.  
The Commission Work Programme 2012
123
 has identified that the interrelationship 
between private enforcement and public enforcement is an important area where a legislative 
measure would be needed.
124
 In the Explanatory Memorandum of the proposal for a Directive 
on antitrust damages actions, the European Commission has recently noted that: 
“There is a significant risk that effective public enforcement by the Commission and NCAs 
would be jeopardised in the absence of EU-wide regulation of the interaction between public 
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and private enforcement, and in particular of a common European rule on information from the 
file of a competition authority being available for the purposes of a damage action.”125  
 
The Court of Justice decisions in Pfleiderer
126
 and its subsequent application by the 
German court in Pfleiderer
127
 and by the English court in National Grid
128
 clearly show that 
there was a level of uncertainty as to whether all the evidence collected by a regulator is 
accessible to injured parties in support of their private damage claims. Moreover, Enron Coal 
Services Ltd (In Liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Ltd
129
 does suggest that it may be 
questionable whether the majority of evidence, which has been collected by the regulator, 
would be of great value in private proceedings.
130
  Indeed, the decision of the English Court 
of Appeal indicates that, even in a follow-on action, an injured party does face numerous 
evidential hurdles. As Lord Justice Jacob noted, “the ‘split’ jurisdiction of regulator for 
infringement, tribunal for causation and assessment of damages also needs some 
reconsideration.”131 The problems would be multiplied in a cross-border context as the need 
for taking evidence by a competition authority located in one Member State may be needed 
with a view to supporting private competition law proceedings taking place in another 
Member State.
132
  
In view of the foregoing, the Damages Actions Initiative may be seen as an opportunity 
for the EU legislator to look at the current two-step adjudication enforcement structure, and 
its cross-border implications. It should be noted that Recital 25 of the Proposed Directive 
moves in this direction by stating that: 
“To enhance legal certainty, to avoid inconsistency in the application of those Treaty 
provisions, to increase the effectiveness and procedural efficiency of actions for damages and 
to foster the functioning of the internal market for undertakings and consumers, it should […] 
not be possible to call into question a final decision by a national competition authority or a 
review court finding an infringement of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty in actions for damages 
relating to the same infringement, regardless of whether or not the action is brought in the 
Member State of the authority or review court.”133  
                                                 
125
 Explanatory Memorandum - Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions, 11. 
126
 Pfleiderer, supra n 7. 
127
 In the Pfleiderer case, "the German court ruled against disclosure of leniency documents". The High Court 
referred to the judgment of the Amstgericht Bonn of 30 January 2012 in the Pfleiderer case. See National Grid, 
supra n 10, [60]. 
128
 National Grid, supra n 10, [56 – 60]. 
129
 Enron Coal Services Ltd (In Liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 2. 
130
 See more: KPE Lasok, ”Some Procedural Aspects and How They Could/Should be Reformed” in Danov, 
Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 207-214; J Webber, ”Observations on the Implications of Pfleiderer for 
Leniency Programmes” in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 215-222. See more: Section E, infra. 
131
 Enron, supra n 129, [149]. 
132
 See M Danov, “EU Competition Law Enforcement: Is Brussels I suited to dealing with all the challenges?” 
(2012)  61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 27. 
133
 Recital 25 of the Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions. See also: Art 9 of the Proposed 
Directive. Compare the current framework: Arts 11–14 of Council Regulation 1/2003. See more: S Brammer, 
Co-operation Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2009). 
Journal of Private International Law – Accepted for Publication – approx. 21,000 words 
22 
 
 
However, there are several outstanding issues which might need to be carefully 
addressed. First, problems are bound to arise with regard to public antitrust enforcement 
proceedings before an NCA located in one Member State and parallel private proceedings 
related to the same breaches of Article 101 TFEU and/or Article 102 TFEU before a court in 
another Member State. Secondly, a recent comparative study
134
 appears to suggest that an 
important question, in a cross-border context, is whether a Member State court is entitled to 
refuse the recognition of a decision taken by a foreign national competition authority that does 
not respect due process rules in its adoption.
135
 While a national court would apply civil 
procedure rules that presuppose respect of due process, an NCA would apply administrative 
procedure rules that could potentially raise concerns as to the undertaking’s right to a fair trial 
and hearing.
136
  
Thirdly, even if the regulator had respected the due process rules in the adoption of its 
decision, the two-step adjudication process would create specific problems when it comes to 
imposing personal liability for EU competition law infringements in a cross-border context. In 
particular, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are meant to prevent anti-competitive “activities of 
undertakings.”137 However, the concept of undertaking used by the regulator when 
establishing an infringement, and the fact that most multinational businesses would involve 
not a single legal entity, but groups of companies, suggests that there are specific problems 
which must be addressed with regard to private proceedings. In particular, whilst, “a 
rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise a decisive influence over 
the conduct of its subsidiary”138 would allow the Commission to impose fines on the ultimate 
parent company, problems would be bound to arise in private proceedings as it may be far 
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from clear “which legal entities within a corporate group are liable for an infringement of 
Article 101(1) TFEU and to what extent”.139 The following questions would be key elements 
in a cross-border context: Can an injured party sue in England a local subsidiary that is not 
named in the Commission’s decision? Will there be a binding finding that there is an 
infringement by a local subsidiary that is a part of a group of companies which was found to 
be one infringing undertaking within the meaning of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU? Would 
such an action be a stand-alone action or a follow-on action? These are not academic 
questions, but very practical ones, which have been subject to heated debates before the 
English courts.
140
 In particular, some of these issues were considered by the CAT in Emerson. 
In this case, the injured parties brought a cross-border EU competition law action against 
Carbone GB and several other defendants including Carbone SA. The claim was preceded by 
a decision of the European Commission establishing a single and continuous infringement of 
Article 101(1) TFEU.
141
 As a result, the Commission imposed fines on a number of legal 
entities, including Carbone SA. However, Carbone GB was not mentioned at all in the 
operative part of the Commission decision which raised the question whether the finding that 
the parent company, Carbone SA, has infringed EU competition law is binding on the 
subsidiary, Carbone GB, so that it can be imputed with liability.
142
 Most recently, Emerson 
Electric Co, Valeo SA, Robert Bosch CmBH as claimants settled with the defendants, Morgan 
Crucible Company Plc, Schunk GmBH, Schunk Kohlenstofftechnik GmBH, SGL Carbon SE, 
Mersen SA and Mersen UK Portslade Ltd, so that a level of uncertainty will remain in the 
area. That said, the Emerson litigation illustrates well how the current enforcement pattern 
and the existing level of uncertainty do shape litigants’ strategies in a cross-border context in 
so far as the confidential settlement in question was reached, after the parties had been 
engaged in competition law proceedings for more than six years.
143
 
Furthermore, Toshiba Carrier and others v KME Yorkshire and others
144
 may be seen 
as yet another example which suggests that specific jurisdiction issues arise in follow-on 
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actions against subsidiaries that were not mentioned in the operative part of the Commission 
decision. In other words, any mode of governance must inter alia take account of the cross-
border aspects of EU competition law infringements with a view to setting up an efficient 
enforcement regime. Indeed, the governance aspects of cross-border EU competition law 
enforcement activities would be important in view of the important jurisdictional differences 
which would be perceived as important by litigants in a cross-border context. 
 
2. Jurisdictional Differences and Litigants’ Strategies in the EU Context  
Given the importance of the law of procedure for the litigants in EU competition law claims, 
the authors were particularly interested in the existence of procedural advantages for a 
claimant to bring his EU competition law action in one Member State rather than another. The 
issues are seemingly important in the light of the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying 
the recent Proposal for a Directive for Antitrust Damage Actions, in which the drafters have 
stated that:  
“Because of th[e] marked diversity of national legislations, the rules applicable in some 
Member States are considered by claimants to be much more suitable for bringing an antitrust 
damages action in those Member States rather than in others. These differences lead to 
inequalities and uncertainty concerning the conditions under which injured parties, both 
citizens and businesses, can exercise the right to compensation they derive from the Treaty, and 
effect the effectiveness of such right. Indeed, where the jurisdictional rules allow a claimant to 
bring its action in one of those ‘favourable’ Member States and where that claimant has the 
necessary resources and incentives to do so, it is thus far more likely to effectively exercise its 
EU right to compensation than when it cannot do so”145 
  
The law of the forum of the country where the action is brought may play an important 
role because, as noted elsewhere,
146
 the question ‘whether certain evidence proves a certain 
fact … is to be determined by the law of the country where the question arises.’147 The answer 
to this question in many cases would be pre-determined by establishing jurisdiction in the 
injured party’s preferred forum.148 Although Regulation 1/2003 stipulates that the burden of 
proving an infringement of Arts 101(1) and 102 TFEU rests on the party or the authority 
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alleging the infringement,
149
 it does not set the standard of proof.
150
 In fact, Recital 5 of the 
Regulation states that: 
“this Regulation affects neither national rules on the standard of proof nor obligations of 
competition authorities and courts of the Member States to ascertain the relevant facts of a 
case, provided that such rules and obligations are compatible with general principles of [EU] 
law.”  
 
This text could be interpreted as leaving the domestic legal system of each Member 
State to determine what the ‘required legal standard’ of proof is.151 In other words, the 
standard of proof is to be determined by the law of the court where proceedings have been 
brought.
152
 The answer to the question whether jurisdiction variations make a difference for 
an injured party bringing a cross-border EU competition law claim brought in an enlarged 
Europe was important in so far as it has been noted that “the age-old gap between the 
procedural families in Europe, especially the gap between the Civil Law and Common Law 
countries, has been reduced in size.”153  
The gathered data clearly illustrates that procedural differences matter with regard to 
cross-border EU competition law actions brought in the European context. In particular, as 
already noted, 29 respondents from England and Germany thought that injured parties could 
gain some procedural (and/or substantive law) advantages by bringing their claim in one 
jurisdiction rather than another.
154
 This finds support in the case law
155
 which clearly shows 
that issue of jurisdiction could be a subject of heated debates before the courts.
156
 The most 
important procedural aspects can be summarised as: disclosure; speed of proceedings; and 
standard of proof. In particular, on 17 occasions in England and on 11 occasions in Germany, 
the disclosure rules were mentioned as a very important procedural aspect which could 
influence a claimant’s decision where to bring an EU competition law action. The latter point 
may be strengthened by the Commission’s observation that “the lack of adequate rules on the 
disclosure of documents […] means that [potential claimants may] have no effective access to 
                                                 
149
 See Art 2 of Regulation 1/2003. 
150
 J. Faull and A. Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, 2nd edn, (OUP, 2007) 95. 
151
 Faull and Nikpay, supra n 150, p 95. 
152
 Arts 1(3) and 22(1) of Rome II. See more: Danov, supra n 1, Ch 5. 
153
 CH Van Rhee, 'Introduction' in C. H. van Rhee (Ed), European Traditions in Civil Procedure (Itersentia, 
2005) 3, 22. 
154
 See more Danov and Dnes, supra n 8. 
155
 Provimi, supra n 7; SanDisk Corporation v Koninklijke Philips Electronics and others [2007] EWHC 332 
(Ch), [2007] BusLR 705; Cooper Tire, supra  n 10; Toshiba Carrier, supra  n 10. See more: M Danov, 
”Jurisdiction in Cross-Border EU Competition Law Cases: Some Specific Issues Requiring Specific Solutions” 
in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 167-196 
156
 See J Lawrence and A Morfey, ”Tactical Manoeuvres in UK Cartel Damages Litigation” in Danov, Becker 
and Beaumont, supra n 2, 149-158; T Reher, ”Specific Issues in Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions 
Brought by Multiple Claimants in a German Context” in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 159-165; 
Danov, supra n 1. 
Journal of Private International Law – Accepted for Publication – approx. 21,000 words 
26 
 
evidence”157 in some Member States. Also, the speed of the procedure (i.e. the time it takes 
for an award to be made, or for an injured party to force a settlement) was considered to be an 
important factor; this was submitted on 15 occasions (12 occasions in England and 3 
occasions in Germany). Thirdly, the standard of proof was mentioned as a decisive factor by 
one participant from Germany, and as an important factor by one participant in England as 
well. 
In view of the foregoing, one should say that the relative importance of the procedural 
rules reinforces the suggestion that a national legislator is best placed to address the problems. 
This could even allow for regulatory competition as it would be always open for the injured 
parties to bring their actions in the "jurisdiction judged most hospitable"
158
 on the basis of 
jurisdictional rules under Brussels I.
159
 However, this would be subject to the injured parties 
being able and being prepared to pay the cross-border litigation costs
160
 which could, of 
course, be offset against a potential damages award.  
The interview data clearly demonstrates that costs and damages would be other 
important factors to be considered in the European context. This is indeed submitted on 20 
occasions in England and on eleven occasions in Germany, and is in line with literature 
suggesting that estimated damages are an important consideration.
161
 Although data from 
England appears to suggest that damages would be dominated by procedure which would pre-
determine what and when would be awarded,
162
 the majority of respondents from England 
and Germany clearly state that availability of a passing-on defence would be an important 
consideration in a European context. The issue is indeed important in view of the 
Commission’s submission that various “national rules on passing-on (where existing 
differences have major implications for the ability of direct/indirect purchasers to effectively 
claim damages and, in turn, for the defendant’s chances of avoiding compensation for harm 
caused)”163 may be regarded as an example of divergence which justifies legislative 
intervention at EU level.  
It should be noted that all interview respondents from Germany stated that costs are an 
important issue to bear in mind when deciding where to bring a cross-border competition law 
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claim as a cost-benefit analysis is the basic principle which shows whether an action is 
economically attractive. On 12 occasions in England, it was submitted that competition law 
litigation is expensive. Costs can be very high in all litigation,
164
 but may be especially high in 
competition law claims
165
 where defendant companies tend to employ very expensive law 
firms, and where economic experts are frequently employed at considerable expense.
166
 The 
litigation costs could be further increased if the defendants employ delaying strategies which 
are attractive in the current state of uncertainty with regard to cross-border EU competition 
law actions.
167
 In Germany, on five out of eleven occasions, it was clearly stated that delaying 
is a strategy which can be employed by members of an infringing undertaking in a cross-
border EU competition law action. In England, on 15 occasions, it has been submitted that 
delaying would be quite a common strategy to be employed by a defendant. However, not all 
preliminary matters raised by the defence are abusive: five participants from England noted 
that preliminary matters are often raised simply because liability, and therefore damages, 
often hinge on a preliminary matter.
168
  
That said, the way the current legislative framework shapes the litigants’ strategies may 
be further illustrated by the series of jurisdictional challenges
169
 in follow-on actions before 
the English courts. A good example is the recent judgment of the UK Competition Appeal 
Tribunal in Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan.
170
 In this case, the claim was initiated in December 
2010. Deutsche Bahn (and 29 other claimants) brought damage claims against Morgan (and 5 
other defendants). The claim was preceded by a decision of the European Commission finding 
an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.
171
 The cross-border nature of the claims can be easily 
sustained by putting forward that: on the claimant’s side, there were originally 12 claimants 
established in Germany, six claimants from England,
172
 five claimants from the Netherlands, 
two claimants from Portugal, two claimants from Italy, two from Sweden, one from Spain, 
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and one from Norway; on the defendant’s side there were three defendants from Germany, 
one from the UK, one from Austria and one from France.
173
 In the circumstances, the claim 
was brought under Article 6(1) of Brussels I, which is specifically designed for multi-
defendant cases. It states that: 
 “a person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued[,] where he is one of a number of 
defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims 
are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.”  
 
The rationale of Article 6(1) is to centralise litigation against all defendants in one 
Member State and avoid the risk of (potentially) irreconcilable judgments if the different 
actions were brought in different Member States. Since the EU competition law infringements 
in Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan caused damages to claimants in a number of Member States, 
Article 5(3) of Brussels I was not originally pleaded as a basis for jurisdiction. The injured 
parties’ strategy may be explained by the fact that it is well established by the English High 
Court that ‘[t]he jurisdiction based upon the place of the harmful event will be international, 
while the jurisdiction based upon the relevant harm will be restricted to England and 
Wales.’174 In other words, the courts in England as being the place where damage was felt 
would only have jurisdiction for the damage that occurred here, and they would not have 
jurisdiction to award damages to the injured parties for the damage they had suffered in other 
Member States. The narrow interpretation of Article 5(3) leaves no doubt that “the claimants 
aimed for a United Kingdom jurisdiction against all defendants”175 under Article 6(1) of 
Brussels I.  
However, to rely on Article 6(1) an injured party has to establish a “good arguable case” 
that the English court has jurisdiction, and that the requirements of Article 6(1) Brussels I 
have been satisfied.
176
 To this end, it must be shown that “there is a real issue between the 
Claimants and one of the Anchor Defendants, that is, an issue which cannot be struck out.”177 
In Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan, there was only one UK defendant, Morgan. Morgan 
defeated the claimants’ strategy to centralise litigation in the UK by bringing an “application 
to have the claim against it struck out on the ground that it has been brought out of time.”178 
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The application, which succeeded before the Competition Appeal Tribunal,
179
 was 
subsequently rejected by the English Court of Appeal.
180
 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
granted to Morgan a permission to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal.
181
 
In the circumstances, the UK claimants had to change their tactics. In particular, they 
sought from the Competition Appeal Tribunal to lift the stay to their claims against the other 
five defendants.
182
 They had to base their damage claims on Article 5(3) of Brussels I rather 
than Article 6(1). The UK claimants’ application for a limited lifting of the stay was 
granted.
183
 In this context, the CAT held that “[j]urisdiction is supposed to be determined 
swiftly and efficiently at the outset of proceedings […].”184 With this in mind, one should say 
that the growing number of jurisdiction challenges before the UK courts does suggest that 
there are some important issues with respect to governance aspects of cross-border EU 
competition law claims which must be addressed head-on by the EU policy-makers. 
 
 
3. Specific Aspects in Relation to Consumer Claims  
The high costs, which could be fuelled by the high level of uncertainty in cross-border EU 
competition law proceedings,
185
 may potentially deter claims brought by consumers and 
SMEs in so far as litigation costs/risks are important factors to be considered in claims 
brought by consumers and SMEs who may be prone to economise (unless they have a funding 
scheme in place) on the costs by bringing claims in their home states.
186
 Six out of 11 
interviewees from Germany thought that it would be beneficial for plaintiffs to sue in their 
home state. Many participants from England made a clear distinction between claims brought 
by consumers and SMEs, on the one hand, and claims brought by big companies, on the other 
hand. On nine occasions in England, it was submitted that it would be beneficial especially 
for SMEs or consumers to sue in their home states. The point was clearly outlined by the 
European Commission which has recently stated that:  
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“As injured parties with smaller claims and/or fewer resources tend to choose the forum of 
their Member State of establishment to claim damages (one reason being that consumers and 
smaller businesses in particular cannot afford to choose a more favourable jurisdiction), the 
result of the discrepancies between national rules may be uneven playing field as regards 
actions for damages and may affect competition on the markets in which these injured parties 
operate.”187  
 
Thus, the low mobility of consumers and SMEs suggest that an enforcement gap may 
remain in some Member States unless there is a legislative reform at EU level. Danov, 
Fairgrieve and Howells
188
 have demonstrated some specific features of the collective redress 
antitrust damages actions by examining two litigation patterns as displayed in Emerald 
Supplies v British Airways
189
 and In Re International Air Transportation Surcharge Antitrust 
Litigation.
190
 They have noted that there are three important issues which need to be carefully 
considered by the policy-makers with a view to closing the enforcement gap. First, the fact 
that there would be multiple victims of EU competition law infringements in various 
countries is an important issue which needs to be carefully considered. Secondly, the 
numerous victims would have suffered different levels of damages, and, as a result, they may 
have different interests in so far as those affected by an EU competition law infringement may 
be up or down in the chain of distribution (i.e. passing on or absorbing the inflated price). 
Thirdly, consumers, who would normally absorb the loss, would be reluctant to bring such 
actions due to the negligible amount of damages suffered by them in comparison with the 
high litigation costs.
191
 The difficulties have been clearly noted in Recital 31 of the Proposed 
Directive which acknowledges that “it may be particularly difficult for consumers or 
undertakings that did not themselves make any purchase from the infringing undertaking to 
prove the scope of that harm.”192  
Thus, there is certainly a case for reform. In particular, given that most EU competition 
law infringements are cross-border in nature (affecting consumers and businesses in a number 
of Member States), one could convincingly argue that that evidential hurdles and issues of 
binding effect of administrative decisions adopted at national level must be carefully 
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considered by policy-makers along with the issues of litigants’ mobility and the possibility for 
irreconcilable judgments/decisions across jurisdictions. 
 
E. THE NEW MODE: GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER EU COMPETITION 
LAW ACTIONS IN EUROPE 
How should the Union exercise its competence? Art 5 TEU defines the limits of Union 
competences, and lays down the principles which should be used by the EU legislator when 
deciding how to exercise its competence.
193
 The Explanatory Memorandum specifies that:  
“[the proposed Directive] is based on both Articles 103 and 114 of the Treaty, because it 
pursues two equally important goals which are inextricably linked, namely (a) to give effect to 
the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty and (b) to ensure a more level 
playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market, and to make it easier for citizens 
and businesses to make use of the rights they derive from the internal market.”194  
 
However, given the cross-border implication of most EU competition law 
infringements, which would affect consumers and businesses in a number of Member States, 
the policy-makers should consider whether Article 81 TFEU, which confers the EU 
competence in all private international law matters with a cross-border element,
195
  should not 
be used as an appropriate legislative basis for other legislative measures aiming to promote 
regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust damages claims. The significant majority of 
our respondents are against a reform at EU level and in favour of a system of regulatory 
competition between procedural and substantive law regimes. In other words, the respondents 
appear to favour inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust law 
dispute resolution to attract claimants and produce efficient enforcement results. It is well 
established that “[i]n the absence of centrally drafted uniform rules, free movement enables 
regulatory competition between legal orders.”196 In view of that, one would have thought that 
the best way forward may be for the Union to encourage Member States to legislate on 
antitrust dispute resolution.
197
 This also appears to be the spirit of the Proposed Directive in so 
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far as it leaves the Member States a level of flexibility with a view to implementing the 
proposed measures, “while leaving room for individual Member States to go further, should 
they wish so”.198 
How should the EU “govern” cross-border EU competition actions? How should the EU 
legislator devise the relevant framework with a view to closing the enforcement gap and 
providing redress for those who have suffered harm as a result of an EU competition law 
infringement?  
 
1. One Step Adjudication – Closing the Enforcement Gap While providing for 
Certainty and Consistency  
As it was demonstrated,
199
 a two-step adjudication process, in which arguably a regulator is 
better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, a court is better 
placed to award damages
200
 does affect the litigants’ tactics. It leaves an enforcement gap in 
so far as the regulators across Europe would not have the resources to investigate all the EU 
competition law infringements.
201
 The evidential hurdles in follow-on actions may be seen as 
a deterrent for some injured parties because a “problem arises where, in the infringement 
decision, the competition authority is using the facts found by it to drive a particular theory, 
which may cause difficulties in a follow-on action if it becomes necessary to link the 
infringement to the facts of the case and, more particularly, the facts relating to causation and 
loss.”202 Enron203 clearly shows the “fact that an infringement has been established [by a 
regulator] does not show, as a necessary implication, that such damage has been caused.’204 
As already noted,
205
 some specific issues,
206
 which relate to the two-step adjudication process 
were put forward in Pfleiderer
207
 and National Grid
208
 which may be seen as yet another 
evidence that it may be very difficult for an injured party in a follow-on action to prove that 
the cartel caused him loss.
209
 Although injured parties appear to believe that leniency material 
would be valuable to them, Webber shows that “the file of evidence held by the Commission 
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(including the leniency material) was not compiled for this purpose and may therefore be of 
limited value”210 in a follow-on action. In other words, there is a strong case that the 
institutional architecture of antitrust enforcement may need to be revamped, in order for the 
EU legislator to close the enforcement gap, which appears to exist at present, and to provide 
for consistent and efficient enforcement of EU competition law provisions across Europe.
211
 
Difficulties would often arise with regard to the parallel proceedings before a regulator, 
and a national court.
212
 Bos and Möhlmann
213
 have submitted that if a national court stays its 
proceedings until the decision of the European Commission (or a ruling given on it by a 
European Court) has become final and binding, then that national court would delay the 
adjudication on such a case for several years. It has been argued that a national court should 
aim to safeguard the rights of the litigants to have the case determined within a reasonable 
period of time in compliance with Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
214
  
Also, given the cross-border nature of most EU competition law infringements, further 
issues are bound to arise because Regulation 1/2003 does not deal with the problem of 
coherent and uniform application of EU competition law in proceedings before an NCA 
located in one Member State and private EU antitrust law proceedings related to the same 
breaches of Article 101 TFEU and/or Article 102 TFEU before a court in another Member 
State. As noted above,
215
 the Union legislator has identified some of the problems in the 
proposed Directive, and, as a result, Article 9 addresses some of the problems in follow-on 
actions. However, there are some issues which need to be carefully considered. In particular, 
problems are bound to arise in parallel proceedings (as opposed to follow-on actions) since 
potentially irreconcilable decisions on the same (or a related) EU competition law issue by an 
English court, for example, and a foreign competition authority should be avoided.
216
 
Furthermore, as already submitted,
217
 proceedings before an NCA could potentially raise 
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concerns as to the undertaking’s right to a fair hearing.218 Nazzini has argued that ‘the current 
EU competition enforcement regime, which is characterized by an administrative decision-
maker with no guarantees of independence and impartiality and deferential judicial review, is 
unconstitutional.’219 In view of that, mechanisms allowing for some form of consolidation of 
the two sets of proceedings before national courts
220
 might be desirable as the national courts 
would be best placed to be a major venue for competition law actions, if adequately supported 
by the NCAs and the European Commission.  
Judge Pelikánová
221
 addresses the problems by suggesting that the legislator should 
“leave to the European Commission solely the inquiry, with the duty to introduce a criminal 
or civil action before the Court. The system would better fulfil the requirements of the 
ECHR”.222 Indeed, an one-step adjudication regime might be necessary if the EU legislator 
aims to provide an “effective remedy”223 for those who have suffered harm as a result of an 
EU competition law infringement. As noted elsewhere,
224
 it may be far from efficient to have 
one set of proceedings before an NCA in order to establish a breach of competition law, and 
another set of proceedings before Member State courts in order for a claimant to prove that 
damage has been caused to him.
225
 The procedural inefficiencies of the current two-step 
adjudication (i.e. before the regulator, and before the courts) increases uncertainty, which can 
fuel litigation costs, and could fly in the face of Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  
An one-step adjudication regime may be useful with a view to addressing the problems 
before the courts in follow-on actions brought against defendants, who, despite being a part of 
an infringing undertaking, are not named in the operative part of the Commission’s 
infringement decision (i.e. dispositif).
226
 Moreover, the consolidation of proceedings before 
the national courts may be necessary if the EU legislator wants to make sure that the extent to 
which a company has made redress is taken into account by the competent authorities when 
                                                 
218
 Forrester, supra n 136; Killick and Berghe, supra n 136. 
219
 Nazzini, supra n 136, 1005. 
220
 Compare: BIS Consultations, supra n 193, [241-243]. 
221
 I. Pelikánová, ”The General Court and its role in EU competition law cases” in Danov, Becker and 
Beaumont, supra n 2, 103-107. 
222
 Ibid 104. 
223
 See Art 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
224
 See Danov and Dnes, supra n 8. 
225
 See M Danov and F Becker, “Concluding Remarks: Promoting Regulatory Competition - Issues to be 
Addressed” in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 81-93. See also: KW Dam, “Class actions: efficiency, 
compensation, deterrence, and conflict of interest” (1975) 4 Journal of Legal Studies 47, 48. 
226
 See Emerson Electric Co v Morgan Crucible Company PLC and Ors [2011] CAT 4 [38]. 
Journal of Private International Law – Accepted for Publication – approx. 21,000 words 
35 
 
determining what level of fine to impose.
227
 There is no scope for offsetting fines and 
damages in the current system.
228
 A public enforcement action would normally precede a 
damages action. The level of damages would be far from certain at the stage when an 
authority decides on the level of fines. Similarly, in a follow-on action, the court is supposed 
to award damages which would compensate the victim/s irrespective of the fine imposed by 
the competition authority. This clearly shows that there is limited scope for consolidation of 
the fines and the damages in the current system, and consolidating both procedures before the 
national courts might be a good way to achieve this.
229
 One might question the desirability of 
consolidating the proceedings by putting forward that the objective of the fine (i.e. punish and 
deter) is different from the objective of the damages (i.e. compensation). However, in 
response to this, it might be suggested that an efficient enforcement policy would presuppose 
for all enforcement objectives (i.e. injunctive; punitive; compensatory)
230
 to be adequately 
pursued in consolidated proceedings. In other words, there seems to be a strong case that an 
efficient regime, which allows for all enforcement objectives to be pursued in one set of 
proceedings rather than in two sets of proceedings, might be the more appropriate way 
forward.  
The foregoing issues must be addressed head-on in Regulation 1/2003. A revised 
version of Regulation 1/2003 may also address the issue of taking evidence by a foreign NCA 
in support of private proceedings in a Member State. Indeed, the question of whether a 
Member State court could request evidence from another Member State’s competition 
authority in support of private proceedings in the former would have to be addressed by the 
Union legislator.  
However, how to provide redress for consumers in a cross-border context, bearing in 
mind the high litigation costs and the negligible amount of damage they may suffer across 
Europe?  
 
2. Effective Remedy in a Cross-border Context: Addressing the Low Mobility 
of Consumers and SMEs and Centralising Litigation 
The recently proposed Commission Regulation states that “[a]ll Member States should have 
collective redress mechanisms at national level for both injunctive and compensatory relief, 
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which respect the basic principles set out in this Recommendation.”231 As already noted,232 
the importance of the procedural aspects of the EU competition law claims brought by 
consumers (or on behalf of consumers) indicates that national legislators are best placed to 
deal with the specific problem. In this context, “Member States should ensure that the 
collective redress procedures are fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.”233 
Similarly, the need for a legislative intervention had been identified already by the UK 
government. Following the submission of the responses by members of the public, in January 
2013, the UK government “decided to introduce a limited opt-out collective actions regime, 
with safeguards, for competition law, with cases to be heard only in the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal.”234 However, the cross-border nature of most European competition law 
infringements, in which damages would often be suffered by businesses and consumers in a 
number of jurisdictions, could complicate the picture.
235
 Bearing this in mind, “[t]he 
Government has therefore decided that the ‘opt-out’ aspect of a claim will only apply to 
UK-domiciled claimants […].”236 The Consumer Rights Bill,237 brought forward a proposed 
amendment to Competition Act 1998, and went on specifying that: 
‘”Opt-out collective proceedings” are collective proceedings which are brought on behalf of 
each class member except— 
(a) any class member who opts out by notifying the representative, in a manner and by a 
time specified, that the claim should not be included in the collective proceedings,  
and 
(b) any class member who— 
(i) is not domiciled in the United Kingdom at a time specified, and 
(ii) does not, in a manner and by a time specified, opt in by notifying the 
representative that the claim should be included in the collective 
proceedings.”238 
 
An opt-in regime applicable to out of jurisdiction claimants might appear to be in line 
with the proposed Commission Recommendation which states that:  
“The claimant party should be formed on the basis of express consent of the natural or legal 
persons claiming to have been harmed (‘opt-in’ principle). Any exception to this principle, by 
law or by court order, should be duly justified by reasons of sound administration of justice.”239  
 
However, an opt-in regime applicable to out of jurisdiction claimants may be 
problematic in a cross-border context because, as argued elsewhere, “the adoption of the opt-
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in regime in respect of a plaintiff’s class domiciled in another Member State […] will 
inevitably lead to parallel collective redress proceedings, pending before different Member 
State courts, in respect of the same infringement raising similar issues of fact and law.”240 
Having a number of Member State courts seised with related EU competition law actions, 
which raise similar issues of fact and law, would fly in the face of the aim of the Union 
legislator to “ensure the effective enforcement of the EU competition rules”241 because the 
high level of uncertainty, which fuels litigation costs at present, would persist in cross-border 
actions. Indeed, Section 17 of the proposed Commission Recommendation states that:  
“The Member States should ensure that where a dispute concerns natural or legal persons from 
several Member States, a single collective action in a single forum is not prevented by national 
rules on admissibility or standing of the foreign groups of claimants or the representative 
entities originating from other national legal systems.”242  
 
Therefore, there is a strong case that the UK government proposal introducing an opt-in 
regime applicable to out of jurisdiction claimants might need to be modified in the light of the 
proposed Recommendation. The low mobility of consumers might be an important factor to 
be considered when devising an effective enforcement regime with a view to promoting inter-
jurisdictional regulatory competition. In particular, an opt-out regime applicable to out of 
jurisdiction claimants, adopted by a Member State, might be necessary to provide an 
“effective remedy” within the meaning of Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
for consumers from across Europe. Also, such a solution might create incentives for 
defendants to settle and achieve finality with a large number of businesses and consumers (i.e. 
speedy and efficient dispute resolution). In other words, an effective enforcement regime 
should take account of the cross-border nature of EU competition law infringements, and the 
fact that groups of companies engage in anti-competitive conduct through their subsidiaries in 
a number of Member States. How to devise an effective redress mechanism which is to be 
applied in the European context? 
It is well established that consumers may suffer damage as direct or indirect purchasers. 
Danov, Fairgrieve and Howells
243
 illustrate that “a gatekeeper can be a major help in 
organising consumers” due to the high litigation costs and negligible amount of antitrust 
damages suffered by the numerous individual consumers across Europe. If the consumers in 
question are direct purchasers, then consumer associations would be best placed to organise 
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consumers and bring representative actions aggregating numerous relatively small damage 
claims on behalf of the consumers on an opt-out basis. However, even if an opt-out regime 
were introduced, the consumer associations may not be well placed to bring EU competition 
law damages claims in cases where “consumers do not buy directly from manufacturers but 
instead from middlemen”.244 In particular, there may be evidential hurdles in claims brought 
on behalf of consumers as many of them may not keep their sale receipts, for example. The 
“evidential difficulties (in the sense that it may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the 
court the facts that do exist, or would have existed in the ‘no cartel’ world)”245 have been put 
forward before the High Court by counsel in Devenish
246
 where the claims were brought by 
companies. The evidential hurdles in claims by consumers would be exacerbated by the 
difficulties caused by the fact that the damage suffered by an individual consumer may be 
very difficult to ascertain as its amount may indeed be negligible in some cases.
247
 For 
example, this appears to be the case in Emerald.
248
 If one assumes that the claimants, who 
were cut flowers’ importers, have passed the overcharge down to the end buyer of a bouquet 
of cut flowers, then it would be far from easy to ascertain how much of the price of the 
bouquet was increased as a result of the overcharge, in order for it to be claimed back by the 
individual consumers. Another case which may be used to illustrate the difficulties is 
Devenish. If one assumes that the cartel-induced overcharge in selling a unit of vitamins to 
Devenish Nutrition was £40
249
 and the cartelised product was purchased by them to 
manufacture speciality products for the intensive livestock sector, then how much of the 
cartel-induced overcharge contributes to the raised price which is ultimately paid by the end 
consumer?
250
 It is beyond doubt that if a claim is brought by the end consumer, then “the non-
assessable cost of responding to discovery and the like will substantially erode, if not exceed, 
any recovery.”251 
Bearing in mind that, due to high litigation costs, it is the large companies that generally 
appear to be bringing EU competition law damages actions, it has been suggested that one 
way of closing the enforcement gap in Europe would be to allow large purchasers, for 
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example, to aggregate claims on behalf of purchasers down the chain of distribution 
(including end consumers).
252
 Such a solution would not only address the passing-on 
problems (as identified by the Commission),
253
 but it also would allow large companies to 
aggregate claims on behalf of consumers of a cartelised product and/or consumers who are 
paying a monopoly price. In such cases, a gatekeeping role will be performed by the judges 
who would exercise judicial control over the cases at the certification stage. The volume of 
sales of the large purchasers, who have opted into the collective redress proceedings, can be 
an objective criterion in assessing their adequacy to act as representatives of the end 
consumers who would be involved on an opt-out basis. Such a proposal inter alia would 
address some of the problems regarding the passing-on defence.
254
 To this end, it would be 
essential to have an appropriately devised certification regime which requires a judge to 
identify the Member States where the businesses (or the consumer associations) that have 
opted in to the action operate and direct their activities to. For example, if the action was 
brought by a large purchaser, then the courts may certify that the opt-in direct purchasers are 
suitable representatives of the claimants from several Member States by identifying the 
volume of their sales (or the sales of their subsidiaries) in the countries in question. In other 
words, the volume of sales of the businesses, which have opted into the collective redress 
proceedings, can be an objective criterion in assessing their adequacy to act as representatives 
of the end consumers from the Member States in which, for example, a cartelised product has 
been sold.
255
 How to address the low mobility of consumers and SMEs, which, due to the 
high cross-border litigation costs, may defeat any regime that aims to promote regulatory 
competition?  
Once an effective redress mechanism had been implemented, the issue of mobility of 
large purchasers (and consumer organisations) could be addressed by an appropriately drafted 
private international law mechanism which would be best incorporated in Regulation 1/2003. 
Although it would be difficult to elaborate a special basis for jurisdiction which requires a 
substantial connection between the breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the effects of 
the anti-competitive agreement or conduct within the territory of the Member State where the 
action is brought and in respect of which the EU antitrust law claim is brought,
256
 there is a 
need for a jurisdiction rule which allows an injured party to centralise litigation against a 
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group of the same companies before the courts at his preferred jurisdiction. Where, for 
example, there is a corporate group with numerous subsidiaries (all of whom form a single 
infringing undertaking), then it should be open for an injured party by establishing jurisdiction 
against one of the subsidiaries to centralise litigation against the whole group of companies as 
well as against the other group/s of companies who were party to the same anti-competitive 
agreement. This could be justified by the fact that EU competition law infringements would 
often directly and substantially affect the markets in several countries and/or regions.
257
  
Such a broad jurisdiction rule must be accompanied by appropriately drafted rules 
which allow the parties to avoid parallel EU competition law proceedings, and centralise 
litigation before the court that is clearly appropriate to deal with the case, avoiding the 
problem of irreconcilable or inconsistent judgments. Indeed, ensuring finality of judgments 
presupposes an appropriately designed mechanism which allows the parties to avoid parallel 
EU competition law. In view of that, Regulation 1/2003 should go a step further and allow the 
court first seised to stay proceedings, in cases where the agreement or practice has no 
substantial direct effects (whether actual or foreseeable) on competition within the Member 
State and where another court is better placed to deal with the case.
258
 Although such a rule 
could work well in theory, the proposed solution in practice may bring even more uncertainty 
unless there are clear criteria for the courts on the basis of which they can exercise their 
discretion. If the Union legislator decides to promote regulatory competition, then procedural 
laws, experience of judges, potential delays as well as heads of damages and remedies could 
perhaps be considered as relevant criteria in the context of parallel proceedings with a view to 
closing the enforcement gap in Europe.  
Another specific issue, which needs to be addressed by the EU legislator in a revised 
version of Regulation 1/2003, concerns the preclusive effects of opt-out collective redress 
judgments/settlements.
259
 An appropriate solution
260
 would be to hold that the recognising 
court should apply a presumption that the opt-out collective EU competition law redress 
regimes of other Member States are compliant with Article 6(1) of the Human Rights 
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Convention as well as with Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.
261
 Indeed, such an approach might find support in Article 47(1) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which states that “[e]veryone whose 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an 
effective remedy […]”.262 Hence, the European Commission’s efforts to close the 
enforcement gap, which would be important for Europe to achieve sustainable economic 
growth, as well as the policy-makers’ impetus to provide redress for those, who have suffered 
damages as a result of an EU competition law infringement, by encouraging collective redress 
antitrust proceedings in Europe might be strong arguments favouring the proposed 
approach.
263
 
Therefore, there is a strong case that an efficient EU private international law regime 
would be crucial to devising an appropriate governance mode and providing effective 
remedies for victims of EU competition law infringements in a cross-border context. 
 
F. CONCLUSION: OTHER ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED IN A BROADER EUROPEAN 
CONTEXT 
The European Commission’s package of legislative proposals may be regarded as an 
important step towards the creation of an effective EU competition law enforcement regime in 
Europe. Given the diverse nature of the European Union and in the light of the proposed 
Directive, it seems that a private international law mechanism which promotes inter-
jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust law dispute resolution may 
need to be employed by the EU legislator as a new mode of governance which might produce 
efficient enforcement results in a multi-level system of governance. Also, one-stop 
adjudication must replace the current two-step adjudication enforcement regime, in which 
arguably a regulator is better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, 
a court is better placed to award damages.
264
 Although, the proposed Directive and the 
relative importance of the procedural rules might suggest that a national legislator could be 
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best placed to address the problems, the low mobility of consumers and SMEs, which may 
defeat any regime that aims to promote regulatory competition, must be addressed by 
appropriately drafted private international rules which should be incorporated in Regulation 
1/2003. 
Whilst Regulation 1/2003 could address the specific competition law problems, 
employing a private international law instrument in the context of cross-border EU 
competition law enforcement would suggest that an institutional reform, which might 
consider the role of the EU courts, would need to be considered in a wider context. The need 
for such a reform was first signalled by a Report by the Working Party on the Future of the 
European Communities' Court System.
265
 The report clearly stated that ‘… the Working Party 
considers that preliminary questions concerning judicial cooperation should be withdrawn 
from the Court of Justice and assigned to a Community court with members drawn from 
specialist private international lawyers.’266 Similarly, Hill has submitted that: ‘The suggestion 
that, within the ECJ, there should be established a specialist chamber (of PIL experts) to deal 
with references under the Brussels I Regulation (and other PIL instruments) has been 
knocking around for well over 30 years. Such reform is seriously overdue.’267 The current 
institutional architecture might need to be reviewed if the EU legislator decided to employ a 
more sophisticated private international law mechanism when allocating jurisdiction and 
identifying the applicable law in cross-border private EU competition law actions, which 
seem to pose particularly acute problems under the current system.
268
 
Indeed, the increased importance of private international law for disputes in civil and 
commercial matters, which may affect businesses, consumers and families, raises concerns as 
to the costs of cross-border litigation as well as to the uniform application of the various 
private international law instruments across the Member States within the EU. This could 
potentially undermine the rule of law because the high costs and the high level of uncertainty 
could adversely affect cross-border claimants’ litigiousness as a number of injured parties 
may believe that the risks of litigation outweigh the benefits.
269
 Such an outcome would fly in 
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the face of the Stockholm Programme which aims to create “a Europe of law and justice”.270 
An important hypothesis, which needs to be investigated by a cross-border research 
consortium, is that the increased reliance on harmonised private international law instruments 
in the EU indicates that the preliminary references seeking their interpretation should go to a 
special European Court or a specialised chamber of the Court of Justice.
271
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